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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff and Appellee, ]
vs.

]
1

LONNIE KIRKLAND MASCIANTONIO,

Case No. 920466-CA

Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the
above-entitled Court by provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), U.C.A.
1953 as amended.
NATURE OF CASE
Defendant was convicted of forgery, a second degree
felony, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington
County, State of Utah, the Honorable James L. Shumate presiding.
She appeals the order denying her motion to quash and the judgment
of conviction contending

that alleged

offense

is a class A

misdemeanor.
Following

the

denial

of

her

motion

to

quash

the

information, Defendant entered a conditional plea of "no contest"
reseirving the right to appeal the issue relating to the grade of
the offense.

The district court entered judgment, stayed the

imposition of sentence, and placed Defendant on probation.
1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Does the forgery of a document purporting to be a receipt
or acquittance constitute a second degree felony or a class A
misdemeanor?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The interpretation of a statute presents a question of
law.

Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).

Utah

appellate courts review questions of law under a correction of
error standard with no deference to the trial court.

Bellon v.

Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991); Ward, 798 P„2d at 759.
See

also.

State

v.

Bagshaw,

180

Utah

Adv.

Rep.

31

(CA,

2/14/92)(Court of Appeals reviewed trial court's interpretation and
application of U.C.A. 76-3-402 under a correction of error standard
concluding that trial court erred in failing to reduce defendant's
convictions to class B misdemeanors).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of all relevant authorities is quoted in the
body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was charged with forgery, a second degree
felony, by an information which alleged that the Defendant executed
a writing purporting to be the act of one Leslie Church, "said
writing representing an interest in or claim against property, or
a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or enterprise"
(R 1).
2

The State theorized that the Defendant stole money from
her employer and, in an effort to conceal the resulting cash
shortage of $227.79, fabricated a receipt purportedly executed by
Leslie Church acknowledging the receipt of a cash refund paid in
connection with the return of defective merchandise (T (Preliminary
Hearing) 10, 12-14, 31-32; State's Exhibit No, 1 (See addendum)).
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, Defendant
argued that the State had at best made out probable cause to
believe that the Defendant was guilty of forgery, a class A
misdemeanor (R 30, 38-41)•

Defendant was bound over for trial on

the felony charge (R 33-34).
Upon arraignment, Defendant attacked the information by
way of a motion to quash contending that the information improperly
charged the Defendant with the commission of a second degree felony
(R 36-37, 42-51).

In considering Defendant's motion, the district

judge made the following observations:
Now, with respect with your motion to quash,
Mr. Pendleton, the Court specifically takes
judicial notice of the preliminary hearing as the
District Judge in the Fifth District. I sat as the
committing magistrate in this matter.
I have a
clear recollection of the testimony offered by the
State of Utah at the preliminary hearing in this
matter, and based upon that testimony at the
preliminary hearing, which is the evidentiary basis
for the court's decision on the motion to quash,
the Court having specifically found its findings of
fact with respect to that issue, I again reiterate
in respect to the motion to quash that the forgery,
which is the subject of this matter and the prior
focus at the preliminary hearing, the purported
receipt alleged to have been signed by one Leslie
Church, acknowledging the payment of $227.79 was
not a security, revenue[]stamp or other instrument
in writing issued by the government or agency
thereof. It was not a check with a face amount of
3

$100 or more, an issue of stock, bond or other
instrument or writing purporting to represent an
interest or claim against any property.
I do,
however, find that that particular receipt
allegedly signed Leslie Church was a document which
represented a pecuniary interest in or claim
against the enterpris[e in] question here, which
happened to be the St. George Radio Shack, which is
a dba for Coif's Plumbing.
And with that finding, your motion to quash is
denied based specifically upon the testimony at the
preliminary hearing.
T (Arraignment) 5-6.
Thereafter, the district court entered a written order
denying Defendant's motion to quash the information (R 64-65).
Following

the

denial

of

her

motion

to

quash

the

information Defendant, pursuant to a plea agreement and with
consent of the district court, entered a conditional plea of "no
contest" reserving the right to appeal the issue relating to the
grade of the offense

(R 54-60; T (Arraignment) 17-18).

The

district court entered judgment, stayed the imposition of sentence,
and placed Defendant on probation (R 68-71).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Established principles of statutory construction and
relevant legislative history indicate that a document purporting to
be a receipt or acquittance is not of the same nature as an issue
of corporate stock certificates or bonds. Accordingly, the forgery
of such a document does not fall within the definition of a second
degree felony.

Furthermore, principles of due process of law

mandate the resolution of any legitimate question regarding the
grade of an offense in favor of the criminal defendant.
4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
INDICATE THAT THE SUBJECT OFFENSE IS A CLASS A
MISDEMEANOR.
Section 76-6-501, U.C.A. 1953, reads in relevant part as
follows:
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the
writing is or purports to be:
(a) a security, revenue stamp, or any other
instrument or writing issued by a government,
or any agency thereof; or
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or
more, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other
instrument or writing representing an interest
in or claim against property, or a pecuniary
interest in or claim against any person or
enterprise.
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the
writing is or purports to be a check with a face
amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a
class A misdemeanor.
In construing

the language of this statute

and in

ascertaining the meaning of its general terms the rule of ejusdem
generis applies. The general reference to "any other instrument or
writing" takes color from and is restricted to instruments and
writings similar to issues of corporate stock certificates or
bonds.

See generally, 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §214 (1974).
In People v. Korsen, 117 Misc. 2d 875, 459 N.Y.S. 2d 380

(1983), the defendant was convicted of a class E felony and several
misdemeanors.

The prosecutor filed notice of his intent to have

the defendant sentenced as a "second felony offender" because he
had previously been convicted of a felony in federal court.

The

applicable New York statute would not allow enhancement of the
5

sentence based upon the prior conviction unless that conviction
would have been a felony undei: the laws of the state of New York.
The subject of the federal indictment had been possession
of counterfeit bank checks.

In determining whether or not the

basis for the federal conviction would have constituted a felony
under New York law, the court first referred to New York Penal Law
§170.15:
A person is guilty of forgery in the first degree
when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure
another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a
written instrument which is or purports to be, or
which is calculated to become or to represent if
completed:
1. Part of an issue of money, stamps, securities
or other valuable instruments issued by a
government or governmental instrumentality; or
2.
Part of an issue of stock, bonds or other
instruments representing interests in or claims
against a corporate or other organization or its
property.
Id. at 381.
The New York court concluded:
Clearly, the possession of counterfeit bank checks
does not meet the requirements of Penal Law
§170.15(1), which by its terms is limited to
instruments issued by a government.
It is the
People's position, that counterfeit bank checks of
an incorporated commercial bank, satisfies the
requirements of Penal Law §170.15(2), since they
represent "claims against" a corporation. No case
is cited which supports said contention. . . .
While there is no case law interpreting said
subdivision,
Hechtman,
Practice
Commentaries
printed after Penal Law §170.15 in McKinney's
Consolidated Laws states as follows:
"This first degree crime is, as indicated,
confined to counterfeiting of money, stamps
and comparable government issued instruments,
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and of corporate stock certificates, bonds and
the like, (cf. former Penal Law §§884(3, 5 ) ,
892)." (emphasis supplied.)
Thus, at first blush, it seems clear that Penal Law
§170.15(2) was meant to cover corporate stock
certificates, bonds and various other items of this
specific nature, which were not listed ad seriatum in the
statute.
The court finds that this subdivision is
limited to corporate securities such as stocks and bonds
that are normally traded on a securities exchange or an
over-the-counter market and does not include commercial
instruments such as checks, bank or otherwise.
Id. at 381-82.
In

the

instant

case,

under

the

State's

theory,

Defendant's actions were, at worst, an effort to conceal a theft
through the fabrication of a writing which was not and could not
have been purchased, traded, negotiated, or otherwise circulated in
commerce. A person in possession of this document could not use it
for the purpose of asserting any claim against Radio Shack or
anyone else.

Indeed, the document purports to indicate that a

claim against Radio Shack had been extinguished by payment.
The legal significance of the purported receipt lies in
its availability for use in connection with mounting a defense
against a claim asserted by Leslie Church (if she exists) arising
out of her return of defective merchandise
contends never occurred).

(which the State

Such a document does not undermine

public confidence in important symbols of commerce nor does it
facilitate the perpetration of fraud on a large-scale basis.
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POINT II
RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY INDICATES THAT THE
SUBJECT OFFENSE IS A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR.
The drafters of the Model Penal Code suggest that the
common law crime of forgery developed as the result of the fact
that other common law crimes were inadequate to reach and punish
certain blameworthy conduct.

The drafters also suggest that if

these inadequacies are remedied through the development of other
areas of the law, the need for a separate forgery offense is
diminished.

Nevertheless, forgery is

retained as a separate offense in the Model Code,
in part because the concept is so embedded in
statute and popular understanding that legislative
abolition seems unlikely. Moreover, the special
danger of forgery as a threat to public confidence
in important symbols of commerce and as a means of
perpetrating
large-scale
fraud
is
worth
recognition.
There is also the point that the
offense of forgery should be drafted to redress
injuries beyond those that would be occasioned by
conduct amounting to theft. . . .
The relationship of forgery to theft does have
relevance, however, to the drafting and grading of
the forgery offense. The most serious instances of
forgery will occur in connection with efforts to
defraud, and it seems clear that a modern forgery
provision should be drafted to avoid the imposition
of penalties disproportionate to those authorized
for fraud. . . .
Ordinarily, at least, it would be hard to justify
punishing an employee for forging his employer's
endorsement on a check for $100 more severely than
he would be punished for pocketing $100 of his
employer's cash. This is not to say that forgery
on a large-scale should not be punished severely,
just as it would be difficult to contend that other
large-scale efforts to defraud should not be
regarded as serious offenses. It is only to say
that the relationship between forgery and other
fraudulent schemes should not be ignored in
designing the coverage and penalty of the law of
forgery.
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Model Penal Code §224.1 comment 2, at 284-85 (1980) (footnote
omitted).
Section 76-6-501(3), U.C.A. 1953, is comparable to the
first sentence of Model Penal Code §224.1(2J1.

The Model Code

provision reads:
Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the
writing is or purports to be part of an issue of
money, securities, postage or revenue stamps, or
other instruments issued by the government, or part
of an issue of stock, bonds or other instruments
representing interests in or claims against any
property or enterprise.2
Model Penal Code §224.1 comment 8, reads in relevant part
as follows:
Under Subsection (2), forgery is a second-degree
felony where the thing forged is or purports to be
"part of an issue of money, securities, postage or
revenue stamps, or other instruments issued by the
government, or part of an issue of stock, bonds or
other instruments representing interests in or
claims against any property or enterprise."
In
such cases, the special dangers of forgery are most
likely to be present.
Fraud is likely to be
perpetrated on a considerable scale; it takes
special expertise in the main to reproduce these
types of documents; and confidence in the
authenticity of widely circulating instruments
representing wealth will be undermined. There is
no case today for distinguishing forgery of

See State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 195 (Utah 1987)(absent "meaningful
legislative history . . . we turn to the background and comments of [the] Model
Penal Code").
2

The Utah statute departs from the Model Penal Code including "checkfs]
with a face amount of $100 or more" and instruments representing claims against
"any person" in the definition of a second degree felony. The Model Code deals
with the forgery of checks in the second sentence of Subsection (2) which reads:
Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or
purports to be a will, deed, contract, release, commercial
instrument, or
other document
evidencing, creating,
transferring, altering, terminating, or otherwise affecting
legal relations.
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corporate
securities
in
this
respect
from
government bonds or bank notes, and Subsection (2)
accordingly treats them in the same manner.
[Emphasis added.]
Id. at 303.
In the instant case, it is apparent that the evil which
the State seeks to punish is adequately addressed by the theft
statute.

While the Defendant allegedly sought to conceal a theft

by creating a false document, the concomitant forgery is, under the
clear language of the forgery statute and like the theft itself, a
class A misdemeanor.3
POINT III
DUE PROCESS MANDATES APPLICATION OF THE LESSER
GRADE OF OFFENSE.
In State v. Reed, 183 N.J. Super. 184, 443 A.2d 744
(1982), the defendant went into a banking institution and forged
the name of the owner of a savings account to a withdrawal slip in
an attempt to withdraw $560.

The teller realized that the

defendant was not the depositor and called the police.
On appeal from an order sentencing the defendant for
forgery as a crime of the third degree, the New Jersey court
unanimously held:
Defendant forged a withdrawal slip. Third degree
forgery is a writing which "purports to be part of
an issue of money, securities, postage or revenue
stamps, or other instruments, certificates or
licenses issued by the government, or part of an
issue of stock, bonds or other instruments
representing interest in or claims against any
3

Cf. U.C.A. 76-6-412(1)(c) (theft of property having a value of more than
$100 but not exceeding $250 is a class A misdemeanor).
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property or enterprise."
[Emphasis supplied by
author of opinion.]
We are satisfied that the
withdrawal slip is not part of "an issue" of any of
the items or instruments enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:
21-1 b. . . .
Moreover, it is essential that the offense be
explicitly delineated. Due process demands that
penal statutes be strictly construed.
[Citation
omitted.]
Thus, since the forgery of the
withdrawal slip is not included in the language
defining third degree crimes, it comes under the
catchall provision, "otherwise," and is a fourth
degree crime. Consequently, defendant is entitled
to a reduction in sentence from five years to 18
months on the forgery count.
We so order.
[Emphasis added.]
Id. at 748-49.
Applying similar principles, in State v. Shondel, 22 Utah
2d 343, 346, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
The well-established rule is that a statute
creating a crime should be sufficiently
certain that persons of ordinary intelligence
who desire to obey the law may know how to
conduct themselves in conformity with it. A
fair and logical concomitant of that rule is
that such a penal statute should be similarly
clear, specific and understandable as to the
penalty imposed for its violation.
Related to the doctrine just stated is the
rule that where there is doubt or uncertainty
as to which of two punishments is applicable
to an offense an accused is entitled to the
benefit of the lesser. [Emphasis added.]
The facts of this case present a real and substantial
question of whether the forgery of the subject document constitutes
a felony of the second degree or a class A misdemeanor.
question should be resolved in favor of the Defendant.
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This

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully

submitted that the

judgment of

conviction should be reversed and the case remanded to the district
court with instructions to reduce Defendant's conviction from a
second degree felony to a class A misdemeanor.
DATED this

\^y-

day of August, 1992.

Mi

Gary w. Pendleton
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I caused four true and exact
copies of the within and foregoing docximent to be mailed to the
Utah State Attorney General, Paul R. Van Dam at 236 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, on the

1^*

day of August,

1992.

M

Gary/ W. Pendleton
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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